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From the Courtroom to the Street:
Court Orders and Section 1983
by SHELDON NAHMOD*
I. Introduction
Suppose a judge orders a police officer to bring a lawyer to her
courtroom immediately and to use whatever force is appropriate.
The police officer uses excessive force in doing so.' Or suppose a
judge holds a recalcitrant litigant appearing before her in contempt
and orders a police officer to handcuff the litigant. Again, the police
officer uses excessive force in complying.2 Even if the judge in each
case is protected against § 1983 liability3 by absolute judicial
*Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; J.D. and L.L.M., Harvard Law School; M.A. Religious Studies, University of
Chicago Divinity School; B.A., University of Chicago. Thanks to Michael Wells and
Katharine Baker who read and commented on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also
to my colleagues at Chicago-Kent, where I presented this Article in a workshop.
1. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991), discussed infra. Mireles dealt only with
the judge's immunity and found absolute judicial immunity applicable.
2. See Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g
en banc denied (1997). Chief Judge Richard Arnold, and Judges Theodore McMillian and
Morris Arnold would have granted the suggestion. Hendren, discussed infra at length,
dealt with the police officer's immunity and found quasi-judicial immunity applicable. But
see Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002),
which disagreed with Hendren and ruled, with Judge Bauer dissenting, that quasi-judicial
immunity was inapplicable. The author represented the plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
This statute is the subject of the author's two volume treatise, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF § 1983 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter NAHMOD, CIVIL
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immunity,4 what of the police officers? Are they protected by what
has been termed quasi-judicial immunity or are they protected only
by qualified immunity?6 Although such cases are relatively rare, one
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION].
4. Judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity against § 1983 damages
liability for their judicial acts. Absolute judicial immunity also protects against the need to
defend. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), discussed infra at 105. It is a very
powerful defense for judges because it cuts off the litigation almost immediately,
irrespective of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. For a discussion on judicial immunity,
see NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION ch. 7.
5. Quasi-judicial immunity, when applicable, functions like absolute immunity to
protect against the need to defend and against § 1983 damages liability. For the purposes
of this Article, I use the term to characterize the kind of absolute immunity that
sometimes protects officials who are not judges but whose acts, while not judicial in
nature, are closely related to the judicial decision-making process.
This understanding of quasi-judicial immunity must be sharply distinguished from another
kind of absolute immunity that is sometimes called quasi-judicial immunity: the latter
protects executive officials who function as judges in administrative proceedings. Indeed,
the Court's very first decision setting out a functional approach to immunities, Butz v.
Economou 438 U.S. 478 (1978), discussed more fully in NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 7:25, held that federal executive officials who function as
judges and prosecutors in connection with federal administrative proceedings are
protected by absolute immunity. Subsequently using this functional approach in
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), the Court found that members of a federal
prison's disciplinary committee who heard cases involving inmate rule infractions were
protected by qualified immunity, not judicial immunity, because they were not
functionally comparable to judges. Not surprisingly, this functional approach was later
extended to state executives sued under § 1983 for their judicial conduct in state
administrative proceedings as well and, as a result, many cases dealing with the possible
application of absolute immunity to executive officials for their judicial conduct concern
administrative agencies.
Thus, this Article focuses on quasi-judicial immunity issues of the kind raised by the
hypotheticals at the beginning of this Article. Such issues typically arise in connection
with the acts of court clerks, NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION
§ 7:29 (collecting cases); probation officers, id.; bailiffs, id.; court-appointed persons, id. at
§ 7:30 (collecting cases); and law enforcement officers who enforce court orders, id. at §
7:32 (collecting cases). See discussion infra at 627-36.
6. Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense, protects state and local government
officials from § 1983 damages liability when their allegedly unconstitutional conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of then-existing law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982). Qualified immunity was originally intended to protect against liability but has to a
considerable extent been transformed by the Supreme Court into the functional
equivalent of absolute immunity which protects against even the need to defend. For
example, a defense motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity typically
often stops discovery. Id. at 817-19. Also, a district court's denial of such a summary
judgment motion is immediately appealable if an issue of law is thereby raised. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Despite this transformation, though, qualified immunity
remains less protective than absolute immunity. See NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION ch. 8 for a general discussion on qualified immunity.
Another important aspect of qualified immunity, one that will emerge later in connection
with growth-of-law considerations, is that district courts are required as part of the
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circuit has already ruled that state and local government officials and
employees who violate others' constitutional rights in such
circumstances are protected by quasi-judicial immunity and escape
even the need to defend against damages liability because they
followed the orders of judges
I propose to criticize this circuit decision and to use it as a foil in
order to make some important doctrinal and theoretical points about
judicial orders and § 1983 liability. First, I argue that this decision
does not make a crucial distinction between § 1983 challenges to the
constitutionality of presumptively valid judicial orders and challenges
to their implementation by law enforcement officers.8 Second, I
maintain that it is based on a serious misreading of Supreme Court
judicial immunity and related case law9 and is, further, inconsistent
with the history and purposes of § 1983." Finally, I contend that the
decision is normatively unsound and is inconsistent with corrective
justice1 and the principle of individual responsibility for harm caused
qualified immunity inquiry to determine at the outset whether the plaintiff has stated a
cause of action. See discussion infra at 539-40.
7. See Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997), discussed infra. But see
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002).
8. See discussion infra at 624.
9. See discussion infra at 627-30.
10. See discussion infra at 631-33.
11. Corrective justice, sometimes called "rectificatory justice," is Aristotelian in origin
and refers to remedying the harm wrongfully caused by one person to another. In Book 5
of THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle, in distinguishing corrective justice from
distributive justice (which deals with "distributions of honor or money or the other things
that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution") explains
corrective justice as follows:
[Corrective justice] is a sort of equality indeed, and injustice a sort of inequality;
not according to that kind of [geometrical] proportion, however [like distributive
justice], but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference
whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one... ; the
law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury and treats the parties as
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice being an
inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case.., in which one has
received and the other has inflicted a wound.., the suffering and the action have
been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize things by means of the
penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant .... [C]orrective justice will
be the intermediate between loss and gain ....
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131b4-1132a25 (David Ross trans & rev. by
J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson, Oxford Univ. Press 1991)(1925).
The basis moral premise of corrective justice is the equal dignity of persons. To put this in
Kantian terms:
[A] person.., is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even
to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity ... by
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by unconstitutional conduct;" that it unwisely sacrifices the interests
of injured persons to the interests of the community without any
compelling grounds for doing so; that it may retard the growth of
constitutional law; and that it undermines important educational
functions of § 1983 liability. The decision incorporates an approach
that, if not forcefully repudiated, poses serious risks to § 1983's long-
term viability.
This Article is divided into five parts. By way of background,
Part II discusses judicial immunity and, in particular, Mireles v.
Waco, 3 a ten-year old per curiam Supreme Court judicial immunity
decision that deserves more attention than it has received to date.'4
Part III deals with those cases in which quasi-judicial immunity may
be warranted as a policy matter because the challenged conduct is the
very conduct prescribed in the presumptively valid court order itself. 5
Part IV analyzes the issue posed by the hypotheticals-the proper
scope of immunity where the challenged conduct is different from
that prescribed in the presumptively valid court order-and argues
that only qualified immunity should be applicable.'6 This part also
discusses certain aspects of § 1983 jurisprudence and the common law
immunity background of § 1983. Part V considers the related
"Nuremberg defense"-like question of the § 1983 liability of law
enforcement officers whose challenged conduct complies with
presumptively invalid court orders.'7 Finally, Part VI addresses
which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434-35 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991 (1797). For a very useful discussion, see Richard W. Wright,
The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859 (2000).
A great deal has been written about corrective justice, especially in connection with tort
law See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed.,
1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One
Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992). On the relation between corrective
justice and constitutional torts, see Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective
Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903 (2001) (criticizing position that there
is no "persuasive non-deterrence rationale for forcing government to pay compensation to
the victims of constitutional torts" taken in Darryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 402
(2000); arguing instead that corrective justice is applicable to harm-causing constitutional
violations).
12. See discussion infra at 638.
13. 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
14. See discussion infra at 620.
15. See discussion infra at 624.
16. See discussion infra at 626.
17. See discussion infra at 633.
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corrective justice, individual responsibility under § 1983 and the need
to be sensitive to the dangers of allowing individual interests to be
sacrificed for the interests of the community." It also considers the
effect of quasi-judicial immunity on the growth of constitutional law
and the educational functions of § 1983 liability.
II. Judicial Immunity
A. The Supreme Court's Approach to Judicial Immunity in § 1983
Cases19
Although § 1983 on its face admits no immunities whatsoever,
the Supreme Court has, since Tenney v. Brandhove,° a fifty-year-old
legislative immunity case, interpreted § 1983's silence against a
background of the common law immunity extant in 1871, when § 1983
was enacted. For this reason, when the Court addressed § 1983
judicial immunity for the first time in Pierson v. Ray,21 it apparently
had little difficulty concluding that a judge (a police justice) was
absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for convicting the
plaintiffs under a statute that was later held unconstitutional by the
Court as applied to similar facts. It reasoned that judges should be
absolutely immune from liability for damages:
for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction ... even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly .... It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his
jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial
cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to
fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation
charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on
judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation."2
18. See discussion infra at 636.
19. It is necessary to explore the nature and scope of judicial immunity, if only briefly,
in order to deal intelligently with quasi-judicial immunity.
20. 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951) (holding that absolute legislative immunity protected
state legislators accused of violating the plaintiff's First Amendment rights in the course of
legislative hearings). The Court emphasized that holding hearings was a core legislative
function. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that "person" included legislators. Id. at 381-
83.
21. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
22. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). The Court relied on Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335
(1871), for an all-important distinction between excess of jurisdiction and the clear
absence of all jurisdiction. The former, as in Pierson, does not result in the loss of judicial
immunity, while the latter does. Id. at 351-52.
Summer 20021
Although it could be argued that the Court over-predicted the
intimidation of judges, Pierson nevertheless made very clear that
instrumental considerations relating to the need to promote
independent judicial decision-making trump any normative, fault-
based considerations of corrective justice23 that would otherwise
justify compensating plaintiffs who suffered constitutional harm at the
hands of judges.
The decision in Pierson has been severely criticized as
inconsistent with the clear legislative history of § 1983. As Justice
Douglas pointed out in his dissent, the legislative history
demonstrates unequivocally that judges and judicial misconduct were
among the targets of § 1983 because "certain members of the
judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially
responsible for the wrongs to be remedied."24 In light of this history,
there was, in his view, no good reason to interpret § 1983's statutory
silence as preferring adoption of the common law judicial immunity
rule over its rejection. Along similar lines, others have pointed out an
equally serious interpretive problem with Pierson: § 1983 was clearly
modeled on a criminal statute, now 18 U.S.C. § 242, which was aimed
primarily at judicial behavior and thus abrogated judicial immunity. 5
Pierson's reliance on Tenney's common law immunity approach has
further been criticized because in Tenney, unlike Pierson, there is
"the obvious parallel between state and federal legislators, the latter
constitutionally immune from suit for acts done in their legislative
capacity [under the Speech or Debate Clause]."26
This questionable support in § 1983's language and legislative
history for the ruling in Pierson, combined with the obvious adverse
impact of judicial immunity on those injured by unconstitutional
judicial misconduct, suggests that the Court should have been
23. 1 have argued at length elsewhere that wrongdoing is inherent in official behavior
that falls below constitutional norms and hence, whenever a § 1983 defendant is found to
have acted unconstitutionally and to have caused damage to a § 1983 plaintiff, the
defendant is normatively responsible to compensate the plaintiff for foreseeable harm.
See Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View,
76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990) (responding to, and disagreeing with, John Jeffries, Damages
for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA.
L. REV. 1461 (1989)). Corrective justice considerations implicated in quasi-judicial
immunity are further addressed in the discussion infra at 637.
24. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 563.
25. Don Kates, Jr., Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts:
Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 615 (1970).
26. Comment, Liability of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, 79 Yale L. J. 322, 324
(1969). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (Speech or Debate Clause).
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somewhat cautious in later judicial immunity cases. But the Court
has been anything but cautious.27  For example, in Stump v.
Sparkman,'8 an important and considerably harder case than
Pierson,29 the Court, over strong dissents,3° found absolute immunity
applicable to a judge who, on a mother's ex parte petition, ordered the
sterilization of a fifteen-year-old girl without her knowledge or
consent. It determined that even though it was debatable whether the
judge had jurisdiction under state law to order the girl's sterilization,
the judge did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, but only
in excess of it. Significantly, the Court also went on to find that the
challenged conduct was a judicial act despite the informality of the
proceedings and their ex parte nature. It stated:
[tihe factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial'
one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a
function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.31
Here, according to the Court, both factors were present.32
Read together, then, Pierson and Stump indicated rather clearly
that, despite the Court's subsequently articulated functional approach
to immunities,33 judicial immunity afforded very broad protection for
27. In reality, this is not surprising, since the Justices of the Supreme Court could be
expected to empathize with their fellow judges, at least when personal liability is at issue.
See Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in § 1983 Cases, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 819 (1997) (arguing that the Court's substantive and procedural
changes in qualified immunity doctrine have promoted a pro-defendant posture of
empathy and mercy).
28. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
29. Pierson was easier on its facts than Stump because the judge (a police justice) in
Pierson had found the plaintiffs guilty of violating a statute that was only held
unconstitutional as applied to similar facts by the Supreme Court four years later. Pierson,
386 U.S. 547.
30. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell dissented. Stump, 435 U.S. at 364 (arguing
that the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding were not present). Justice Powell in
particular maintained that judicial immunity was inapplicable because of the judge's
"preclusion of any possibility for the vindication of [plaintiff's] rights elsewhere in the
judicial system." Id. at 368-69.
31. Id. at 362.
32. Id.
33. The Court has adopted a functional approach to immunities under which absolute
immunity does not protect persons but functions. For example, the Court held in Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), that absolute immunity did not protect a judge accused of
firing a probation officer because of her sex in violation of equal protection. Such
conduct, according to the Court, was administrative in nature. Id. The Court in Forrester
described the operation of the functional approach this way:
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judicial conduct. Indeed, that is how the circuits have applied judicial
immunity. It is a rare case indeed where a judge loses absolute
immunity for judicial conduct even remotely connected to a judicial
proceeding because he acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or
because the challenged conduct was not a judicial act.34 Thus, under
these circumstances, the injured party bears his own costs without
ever getting a chance to tell a fact-finder his story about the judge's
allegedly unconstitutional and thus blameworthy conduct.35
B. Unpacking Mireles v. Waco
Just how broadly protective judicial immunity really is became
especially clear in Mireles v. Waco,36 a per curiam decision that is
more problematic the more one thinks about it. In this case the
Supreme Court applied the jurisdictional and judicial act criteria of
Stump and held that a judge accused of ordering police officers to use
excessive force to bring a public defender to him in his courtroom was
protected by absolute judicial immunity.37 The Court noted that the
public defender was dealing with the judge in the latter's judicial
capacity because he had been called into the courtroom in connection
Running through our cases, with fair consistency, is a "functional" approach to
immunity questions other than those that have been decided by express
constitutional or statutory enactment. Under that approach, we examine the
nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has
been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to
liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.
Officials who seek exemption for personal liability have the burden of showing
that such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy,
and the Court has recognized a category of "qualified immunity" that avoids
unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute
immunity.
Id. at 224. On the other hand, there are executive officials who, although ordinarily
protected only by qualified immunity, are sometimes protected by judicial immunity for
their judicial conduct, particularly in connection with administrative proceedings. Parole
board officials are a good example. See NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION § 8:99 (analyzing and collecting cases).
34. See cases collected in NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION §§ 7:16-7:23.
35. See Nahmod, supra, note 27 at 826-32, arguing that the Court's substantive and
procedural changes in qualified immunity doctrine have given priority to the § 1983
defendant's narrative and marginalized that of the plaintiff. As pointed out later,
however, where the allegedly unconstitutional judicial conduct takes place in a judicial
proceeding that is reviewable, the injured party can tell his story to an appellate court. See
discussion infra at 624-27.
36. 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
37. Id. at 10.
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with a pending case.3" While the judge's alleged direction to use
excessive force was not a normal judicial function, this was to put the
inquiry at too particular a level, according to the Court." Under
Stump, the inquiry was into the nature or function of the act, not the
"act itself."4 The Court explained: "In other words, we look to the
particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a
judge, in this case the function of directing police officers to bring
counsel in a pending case before the court."41 The Court also rejected
the argument that the challenged conduct-issuing the order-was
transformed into an executive act through its implementation by
police officers.42 Finally, the Court concluded that the judge did not
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction because his conduct, even if
legally erroneous, was in aid of his jurisdiction. 3
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the Court should have
distinguished between the two orders of the judge: One, ordering the
police to bring the plaintiff before him, was clearly judicial, while the
other, ordering the police to commit a battery, was not. 4  He
observed that this would have been clearer had an interval of several
minutes separated the two orders.
At first blush, the majority was correct in analyzing the
challenged conduct at a relatively high level of generality and thus
finding absolute immunity applicable. If all it took to avoid judicial
immunity were the mere allegation that a judge knowingly issued an
unconstitutional order of the Mireles kind, that would seriously
undermine the protections of the doctrine, which include minimizing,
if not altogether eliminating, the costs of defending against lawsuits.
Indeed, the very purpose of judicial immunity in the § 1983 setting is
to protect against lawsuits alleging that a judge acted with an
unconstitutional motive. 6
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Stump v. sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
41. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991).
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 14. Justices Scalia and Kennedy also dissented, suggesting that in light of
Justice Stevens' dissent, the Court should not have summarily reversed but ordered
briefing and argument. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. The Court in Mireles may have believed that in excessive force cases, it would
ordinarily be too easy for plaintiffs to include the judge as a defendant by simply alleging
that the judge ordered that excessive force be used. The short answer, of course, is that
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Still, there is something to Justice Stevens' dissent. What if,
instead of the allegation of a judicial order to use excessive force,
there had been an allegation that the judge ordered the police officers
to shoot the lawyer in the arm or leg and bring him to his courtroom,
and the police officers had done so? To paraphrase Mireles, this
particular act-ordering the police officers to shoot the lawyer and
bring him into the courtroom-is certainly related to the general
function normally performed by a judge of directing police officers to
bring counsel in a pending case to the court. In addition, this action
appears to be taken "in the very aid of the judge's jurisdiction over a
matter before him" and thus not in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.47 Under the reasoning in Mireles, then, judicial immunity
could apply.
Nevertheless, Mireles can and should be distinguished on the
ground that a judge's order to police officers to bring a lawyer to his
courtroom is a quintessential judicial act because implicit in such an
order is the normal and expected use of some physical force. That
excessive force was ordered by the judge does not change the nature
of the force, only its amount. In contrast, if a judge orders police
officers to shoot the lawyer, this changes not only the amount of force
but its very nature, and this kind of force is not the sort normally
ordered by a judge and expected by litigants and their lawyers.48
this can be readily tested on summary judgment in a qualified immunity setting. Indeed,
this can be tested much more readily than a claim that a judge acted unconstitutionally
with an impermissible motive. Such a claim, based as it is on credibility, would probably
result in the denial of a judge's motion for summary judgment and thus more directly
implicate the policies underlying judicial immunity.
As an example of an impermissible motive judicial immunity case, consider Hawkins v.
Comparet-Cassini, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249-51 (C.D. Cal. 1999), a case in which the
plaintiff prisoner, who had a stun belt placed on him which was then activated for a
sentencing proceeding, sued the judge who ordered the activation, alleging that she did so
to silence him. Finding judicial immunity applicable, the court ruled that the judge's order
was a judicial act because it was for the purpose of controlling a party in the case before
her. Id. In addition, the judge did not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction
because she was hearing a motion in a criminal matter and, under California law, she had
the power to control individuals appearing before her. Id. Here, unlike Mireles, the issue
was the judge's intent and this was therefore an easy case for judicial immunity. To the
extent that the court's order itself, that is, the activation of the stun belt, was challenged,
this could be appealed, even if damages could not be awarded. Id.
47. Id. at 13.
48. For judicial immunity purposes, a judge's order to police officers to shoot a lawyer
and bring him to the courtroom is equivalent to what a justice of the peace did in Gregory
v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974), a much-cited 1974 case that is still good law in
the Ninth Circuit. Here, after the plaintiff, a non-lawyer, had injected himself into a minor
traffic violation case involving a third person, the justice of the peace asked or told the
[Vol. 29:4
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Even if, as I have argued, the judge in the hypothetical should
not be protected by absolute immunity, the Court has nevertheless
considerably broadened judicial immunity and has protected judges at
the expense of plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional harm at
their hands. This has occurred despite the previously noted
questionable basis for § 1983 judicial immunity in the first place. The
result is that where a judge knowingly violates the Constitution and
intentionally harms innocent citizens, she not only escapes damages
liability for that harm but she is also personally free of the need to
explain and defend. In this way, the community's interest in avoiding
any chilling of independent judicial decision-making by judges trumps
individual responsibility for normatively blameworthy, harm-causing,
unconstitutional conduct and thus corrective justice.49 And while this
plaintiff to leave his courtroom. Id. The plaintiff then foolishly refused, daring the justice
of the peace to throw him out, which the justice of the peace, even more foolishly,
proceeded to do, allegedly with excessive force. Id. Rejecting the argument that the
justice of the peace was exercising his inherent power to keep order in the courtroom and
thus was protected by judicial immunity, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he decision to
personally evict someone from a courtroom by the use of physical force is simply not an
act of a judicial nature, and is not such as to require insulation in order that the decision be
deliberately reached." Id. at 64. The Ninth Circuit observed that the challenged conduct
was not amenable to "appellate correction." Id. Also, independent judicial decision-
making would not suffer "in the slightest" if physical assaults by judges in their courtrooms
were not protected by judicial immunity. Id.
Similar reasoning should apply to a judge's order to police officers to shoot a lawyer and
bring him to the courtroom. It is true that in Gregory, the judge physically evicted the
plaintiff, while in the hypothetical, the challenged conduct is a court order. But even a
court order is a physical act: the relevant questions are whether the court order is of the
kind that judges normally (or even extraordinarily) issue and that litigants and lawyers
expect, and whether the judge arguably has jurisdiction, that is, the power to issue such an
order. And for this hypothetical, the answers should be no. Cf. Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d
438, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (a § 1983 damages case where the Sixth Circuit declared:
We hold that stalking and sexually assaulting a person, no matter the
circumstances, do not constitute 'judicial acts.' The fact that, regrettably, Lanier
happened to be a judge when he committed these reprehensible acts is not
relevant to the question of whether he is entitled to immunity. Clearly he is not.
Id. at 44). See also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (a criminal prosecution
brought against the same judge under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
49. Although, strictly speaking, absolute immunity is inconsistent with corrective
justice, I do not mean to suggest that judicial immunity (or legislative or prosecutorial
immunity, for that matter) is never appropriate. Rather, (absolute) judicial immunity
should be limited to core cases directly implicating the deliberative functions of judges and
thus, the operation of the justice system itself. Analogously, Bernard Dauenhauer and
Michael Wells have written:
It follows from our argument that absolute immunity from all relief.., is
inconsistent with the requirements of corrective justice. But of course there are
good reasons for placing limits on the government's liability. Unrestricted
official or governmental liability would surely impair government's ability to
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result may be defensible for most, even if not for all, judicial conduct,
the important questions are whether, and to what extent, the
community's interest should similarly trump normative
considerations: (1) where executive officers whose challenged
conduct is prescribed by presumptively valid judicial orders; (2) where
their challenged conduct is not prescribed by presumptively valid
judicial orders; and (3) where their challenged conduct is prescribed
by presumptively invalid judicial orders.
III. Quasi-Judicial Immunity and Challenges to Conduct
Prescribed by Presumptively Valid Court Orders'
Suppose a court clerk erroneously issues an arrest warrant at the
direction of a judge.' Or a court clerk refuses, pursuant to judicial
direction, to accept the civil filings of inmates. 2 Or a probate court
administrator executes a juvenile division referee's court order of
placement. 3  Or a sheriff, pursuant to court order, enters the
plaintiff's home, seizes nonexempt personal property, and sells it at
public auction. Or, finally, law enforcement officers arrest and
incarcerate the plaintiff pursuant to the order of a trial court which
has found him in contempt.
5
In all of these cases, the challenged conduct is the very conduct
called for by a presumptively valid court order, and in all of these
cases the circuits found that the defendants were protected by quasi-
judicial immunity. The rationales for such decisions vary, however.
Some circuits have broadly suggested that the acts of persons "in the
performance of an integral part of the judicial process" are thereby
protected by quasi-judicial immunity. 6  But this rationale was
perform its necessary functions .... At bottom, the victim's basic interest, if he
is rational, is to live in a well functioning society.... Compensation that would
substantially hamper the government's work would run counter to the very point
of corrective justice.
Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional Torts,
35 GA. L. REV. 903, 924 (2001). However, absolute immunity-in the guise of quasi-judicial
immunity should not be expanded to protect allegedly unconstitutional executive conduct
that is not prescribed by presumptively valid judicial orders.
50. The § 1983 liability of law enforcement officers who follow presumptively invalid
court orders is addressed later. See discussion infra at 634-36.
51. Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988).
52. Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1992).
53. Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994).
54. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986).
55. Valdez v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1989).
56. E.g., Burks v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).
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effectively undermined by the Supreme Court's unanimous 1993
decision in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,7 which held that absolute
judicial immunity did not protect a court reporter accused of failing to
provide a criminal trial transcript in a timely manner to the plaintiff,
thereby delaying his appeal for more than four years. The Court
emphatically rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit which had
found absolute immunity applicable on the ground that preparing a
trial transcript was part of the appellate judicial function which was
"inextricably intertwined with the adjudication of claims. 5 8
Another rationale for decisions applying quasi-judicial immunity
to those whose challenged conduct is prescribed by a presumptively
valid court order is that it is based on avoiding the unfairness of
imposing liability on an official who acts pursuant to court order
while conferring absolute immunity on the judge who issued that
order. 9 However, the challenged conduct in such cases is clearly
executive in nature because it is not the sort of conduct engaged in by
judges but rather by law enforcement officers.' And it seems to be
no less unfair to impose liability on law enforcement officers who
arrest violators of unconstitutional ordinances and statutes while
conferring absolute immunity on the legislators themselves, and yet
we do it all the time. In addition, while this rationale emphasizes
fairness to the law enforcement officer, it entirely ignores fairness to
the injured plaintiff.6
57. 508 U.S. 429,433 (1993).
58. 950 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 508 U.S. 429 (1993). In an opinion by
Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court first noted that there was no history of common-law
immunity for professional court reporters because they did not exist when the common-
law doctrine of judicial immunity developed. It then rejected the court reporter's
proposed analogy to common-law judges who made handwritten notes during trial. Id.
Those notes were not verbatim reports of trials; and even if a judge were to make such
verbatim notes, under the functional approach it was likely, said the Court, that this
conduct would be characterized as administrative in nature and hence protected only by
qualified immunity. Id. In short, court reporters did not perform quasi-judicial functions
because they did not really exercise discretion. Id. Thus, after Antoine it does not suffice
for quasi-judicial immunity that the challenged conduct is simply a part of the judicial
process. Id.
59. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, The Doctrine of Official
Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1955).
60. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 48,
which held that the conduct of a justice of the peace in physically evicting a person from
his courtroom was not a judicial act.
61. Yet another possible rationale, albeit one not mentioned in the cases, is that
quasi-judicial immunity is in reality a qualified immunity surrogate because officials who
act pursuant to a presumptively valid court order will ordinarily be found to have acted in
an objectively reasonable manner even if the court order itself is later determined to have
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A third rationale for quasi-judicial immunity for allegedly
unconstitutional conduct prescribed by a presumptively valid court
order is perhaps the most persuasive: a § 1983 damages action
challenging such conduct is in reality a challenge to the validity of the
court order itself and thus may be thought to directly implicate the
core policies underlying judicial immunity. Since one of the policy
justifications for judicial immunity in general is that an allegedly
erroneous judicial decision ordinarily can be appealed, it makes sense
to suggest that, instead of a § 1983 damages action against the law
enforcement officer, the proper remedy is an appeal of the court
order.62
Consequently, even though the challenged conduct of law
enforcement officials in following presumptively valid court orders is
violated clearly settled law. Under the qualified immunity standard of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), an official
who could reasonably have believed that his allegedly unconstitutional conduct was
constitutional at the time it occurred under the circumstances and in light of then-existing
law, is protected by qualified immunity. Except in those circumstances where an official
has acted unconstitutionally in obtaining the very court order that the official thereafter
follows, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), it is likely that an official who follows a
presumptively valid court order will be found to have acted in an objectively reasonable
manner for qualified immunity purposes, even if it turns out there was a violation of
clearly settled law, because the official could point to his reliance on the legal
determination of the judge. This could even be an "extraordinary circumstance" within
the meaning of Harlow. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. See, on the latter, NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 8:16.
But the assumption that officials who act pursuant to a presumptively valid court order
will ordinarily pass the qualified immunity test depends on the extent to which the court
order violated clearly settled law: if the order was obviously unconstitutional in light of
clearly settled law, then not only would the law enforcement officer not have acted
pursuant to a presumptively valid court order so as to be entitled to assert quasi-judicial
.immunity, but, as discussed later, he would not be protected by qualified immunity either.
However, if the empirical assumption is made that, in the overwhelming number of cases,
court orders to law enforcement officers do not obviously violate clearly settled law, then
this rationale makes some explanatory sense. Nevertheless, it is preferable to confront the
qualified immunity issue head on, rather than disguise it as quasi-judicial immunity.
62. This rationale was applied in a Seventh Circuit case, Henry v. Farmer City State
Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986), where the plaintiffs sued law enforcement officers,
including a sheriff, for damages under § 1983 for executing foreclosure judgments.
Specifically, they alleged that the sheriff wrongfully entered their home, seized their non-
exempt personal property and later sold that property a public auction, all pursuant to a
court order directing the sheriff to enforce a judgment by confession entered by the court
on a promissory note. Ruling for the sheriff, the court reasoned that since the sheriff had
acted pursuant to a presumptively valid court order, quasi-judicial immunity was
appropriate because the court order could be appealed. "The proper procedure for a
party who wishes to contest the legality of a court order enforcing a judgment is to appeal
that order and the underlying judgment, not to sue the official responsible for its
execution." Id. at 1239.
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better characterized as executive rather than judicial in nature, it has
consistently been accorded quasi-judicial immunity in the circuits for
defensible policy reasons.
IV. Quasi-Judicial Immunity and Challenges to Conduct Not
Prescribed by a Presumptively Valid Court Order
A. The Eighth Circuit's Hendren Decision
One of the hypotheticals set out at the beginning of this Article
posited a case in which a judge holds a litigant in her courtroom in
contempt, orders a police officer to handcuff the litigant and the
police officer allegedly uses excessive force in doing so. This
hypothetical is based on the Eighth Circuit case, Martin v. Hendren,63
mentioned earlier, which is a prime example of instrumentalism (in
the name of avoiding over-deterrence) run amok at the expense of
corrective justice and the policies underlying § 1983. In Hendren, the
plaintiff's son was appearing before a traffic court judge when the
plaintiff approached the bench unasked and was twice requested by
the judge to sit down.' She refused and the judge ordered a police
officer to remove her.65 She resisted, there was a bit of a scuffle, she
was next held in contempt by the judge who ordered the officer to
"put the cuffs on her," she was flipped face down on the floor,
handcuffed, pulled up by the handcuffs and her hair, and she was then
taken away.' The plaintiff, who required medical treatment for her
shoulder, thereafter sued the police officer under § 1983 for violating
her constitutional rights."
The Eighth Circuit ruled that quasi-judicial immunity protected
the police officer.' It initially observed that the police officer acted as
a de facto bailiff who obeyed the judge's order to restore order in the
courtroom, and that this order "unquestionably related to the judicial
63. 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (1997).
Chief Judge Richard Arnold, and Judges Theodore McMillian and Morris Arnold would
have granted the suggestion. As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit refused to follow
Hendren and instead held in Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002), that quasi-judicial immunity did not apply to such conduct.
Judge Bauer dissented. Richman, 270 F.3d at 443.
64. Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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function."69 To the plaintiff's argument that the officer did not act in a
quasi-judicial capacity when he carried out the judge's orders using
excessive force, the Eighth Circuit responded by relying on Mireles
which, as noted earlier, held that a judge's order to use excessive
force was a judicial act protected by judicial immunity." Even though
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that, strictly speaking, Mireles did
not deal with quasi-judicial immunity but rather with a judge's order,
it read Mireles broadly for the proposition that the officer's conduct
in "carrying out a judicial command in the judge's courtroom and
presence,"7 even if that conduct was allegedly improper, was
protected by absolute immunity.72 Picking up on Mireles' reasoning
that it was the nature of the function performed, and not the
particular act, that controlled the judicial immunity inquiry, the
Eighth Circuit concluded: "[b]ecause judges frequently encounter
disruptive individuals in their courtrooms, exposing bailiffs and other
court security officers to potential liability for acting on a judge's
courtroom order could breed a dangerous, even fatal, hesitation."73
B. Criticism of Hendren: Misplaced Reliance on Mireles
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's determination, there can be little
doubt that the challenged conduct in Hendren was not judicial in
nature but rather executive. Restraining a citizen with force and
arresting him or her are quintessentially executive functions for
immunity purposes. The conduct in Hendren is, in this regard, like a
warrantless arrest by law enforcement officers, an arrest pursuant to
warrant by law enforcement officers and the use of excessive force in
making an arrest.74 In addition, what the police officer allegedly did
69. Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721.
70. Id. at 721-22.
71. Id. at 722.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 722. Judge Lay dissented, arguing that the majority erroneously relied on
Mireles because that case did not at all address quasi-judicial immunity, but rather the
protection afforded "the first-tier, decision-making function of a judge." Id. at 723. He
also commented that the record did not indicate that the judge instructed the police officer
to use excessive force. Judge Lay declared:
Under the majority's reasoning, if a judge orders a bailiff to remove a litigant
from the courtroom, and the bailiff decides that the most expeditious way to
accomplish this order is to bash the litigant in the head with a baseball bat, the
bailiff would enjoy absolute immunity. This is not the type of action the doctrine
of absolute immunity is designed to protect.
Hendren, 127 F.3d at 723-724.
74. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (warrantless arrest by law enforcement
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in Hendren was clearly not a judicial ruling75 and it was neither an act
normally performed by a judge nor an act consistent with the
expectations of parties appearing before a judge. That the judge in
Hendren may have requested that the police officer take and detain
the plaintiff did not magically convert the officers' executive law
enforcement conduct into judicial conduct protected by absolute
quasi-judicial immunity any more than a police officer's enforcement
of a statute or ordinance would convert that conduct into absolutely
immune quasi-legislative conduct.
Recall that in Mireles, the Court held that the judge was
protected by absolute immunity because his order that a lawyer be
brought to him in connection with a pending case was a judicial act.76
However, in relying on Mireles for the proposition that using
excessive force in connection with judicial proceedings is judicial in
nature, the Eighth Circuit minimized the all-important fact that the
challenged conduct in Mireles was the judge's alleged order to the
police officers to use excessive force to bring the lawyer before him,
and not the use of excessive force by the police officers themselves.
Only the former was held by the Supreme Court to be protected by
absolute immunity. In marked contrast to the situation in Mireles, the
plaintiff in Hendren did not sue the judge for requesting that she be
restrained, but rather sued the police officer who allegedly restrained
her with excessive force in violation of her constitutional rights."
By relying on Mireles, then, the Eighth Circuit in effect
maintained that because the judge, if sued, would be absolutely
immune for ordering the police officer to restrain the plaintiff, the
officer, too, should be absolutely immune. But this cannot be correct.
The Supreme Court had previously rejected the concept of derivative
immunity in the § 1983 setting when it held unanimously that a
private defendant who conspires with an absolutely immune judge is
not derivatively protected from § 1983 liability by the judge's
immunity." Moreover, if the judge in Hendren had personally
officers); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (arrest pursuant to warrant by law
enforcement officers). See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force in
making an arrest).
75. See Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 1986) (Judge Posner dissenting,
arguing that there was nothing in Supreme Court case law or policy to warrant the
expansion of judicial immunity beyond judicial rulings), rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
76. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
77. Hendren, 127 F.3d at 121.
78. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). In a parallel fashion, the Supreme Court
has rejected respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
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stepped down from the bench and physically restrained the plaintiff,
then this conduct would not be judicial in nature because it is
unrelated to the functions usually performed by judges and is
contrary to the expectations of litigants. 9
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit overstated the concern with
avoiding police officer hesitation in complying with a judge's
presumptively valid orders in the courtroom."0 To the contrary: we
want the police officer to hesitate, if only for a moment, to be sure
that the judge's order is carried out in a constitutional manner. The
availability of qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment excessive
force cases provides the appropriate margin for error for police
officers and properly balances the plaintiff's interest in compensation
for harm caused, the community's interest in ensuring that official
conduct complies with constitutional norms, the defendant's interest
in avoiding liability, and the community's interest in minimizing the
chilling effect on independent decision-making.8
U.S. 658 (1978). For individuals, then, personal responsibility is the norm.
79. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) ("[T]he facts determining
whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial one' relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."); Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The decision to personally evict someone
from a courtroom by the use of physical force is simply not an act of a judicial nature, and
is not such as to require insulation in order that the decision be deliberately reached."); see
discussion supra note 48.
80. Hendren, 127 F.3d at 722.
81. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that the objective reasonableness
inquiry for qualified immunity purposes provides an additional layer of protection beyond
the objective reasonableness inquiry for Fourth Amendment excessive force purposes).
Compare Hendren to an earlier Tenth Circuit case that involved a § 1983 damages action
against deputy sheriffs alleging that they used excessive force in executing a search
warrant. Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1990). The Tenth
Circuit emphasized that while absolute quasi-judicial immunity might protect the deputy
sheriffs "from liability for the actual arrest, it does not empower them to execute the arrest
with excessive force." Id. at 404. It reasoned that "a judicial warrant contains an implicit
directive that the arrest and subsequent detention be carried out in a lawful manner." Id.
at 405. But to the extent that the defendants "exceeded legal bounds in executing the
warrant for arrest, defendants have a fortiori violated the very judicial order under which
they seek the shelter of absolute immunity." Id. Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit,
quasi-judicial immunity did not extend to the manner of the execution of a court order.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit distinguished its earlier decision in Valdez v. City & County
of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1989), where the officers were sued for their
compliance with a facially valid court order of contempt, and not for the manner in which
they complied. In Valdez, the defendants had been held to be protected by quasi-judicial
immunity.
Even more on point, the Seventh Circuit, in a post-Hendren decision, dealt with a claim
that police officers used excessive force in a courtroom against the plaintiffs decedent who
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C. Criticism of Hendren: Inconsistency with the Common Law
Immunity Background of § 1983
Hendren's holding that the police officer who allegedly used
excessive force against the plaintiff was protected by quasi-judicial
immunity is inconsistent with the common law immunity background
of § 1983. Although the Supreme Court's reliance on the common
law immunity background in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, has been
severely (and often persuasively) criticized as manipulative,
erroneous or beside the point,82 it may still be appropriate to pay
some attention to that background given its purported importance in
the Court's approach to immunities.
This role was articulated in the Court's first prosecutorial
immunity decision, Imbler v. Pachtman.83 The Court canvassed its
earlier decisions on immunities under § 1983, stating that Tenney
"established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation
had been held in contempt. Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002). The court agreed with the distinction between law
enforcement conduct specifically ordered by a judge and "the separate question of
whether the conduct was lawful or exceeded the actor's authority." Id. at 436. It observed
that, for this reason, Hendren "stretched" the reasoning of Mireles too far, specifically
noting that in Mireles the plaintiff had challenged the judge's order directly. Id. The
Seventh Circuit then went on to consider the policies set out in its quasi-judicial immunity
cases. It first pointed out that the interest in protecting the judicial decision-making
function was not directly implicated where law enforcement officers were accused of their
own wrongdoing. Id. at 438. Next, it observed that the need of law enforcement officers
to act in a split-second manner in dangerous circumstances was not limited to courtrooms.
Id. Finally, it commented that qualified immunity provided adequate protection for law
enforcement officers in this kind of situation so long as their acts were not knowingly
unlawful or plainly incompetent. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning in
Hendren.
Judge Bauer dissented, arguing that Hendren was correct and should be followed by the
Seventh Circuit. Id. at 443. He was most concerned about the courtroom setting and the
need for police officers under the direct supervision of a judge "to maintain order in the
court instanter." In his view, quasi-judicial immunity should protect law enforcement
officers "when carrying out the orders of the court relating to the conduct of court
proceedings themselves." Id. at 444.
Because both Hendren and Richman reached opposite conclusions, there is, as of this
writing, a split in the circuits on the applicability of quasi-judicial immunity to law
enforcement conduct in the courtroom, at least when officers are directed to seize a
person held in contempt.
82. See Jack M. Beerman, A Critical Approach to § 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989); Richard Matasar, Personal Immunities Under
§ 1983: The Limits of the Court's HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741 (1987).
83. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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of them." 4 It then generalized that "each [earlier decision on § 1983
immunities] wis predicated upon a considered inquiry into the
immunity historically accorded to relevant official at common law and
the interests behind it."85 The Court ultimately determined that, in
light of their immunity at common law for their decisions to initiate
and conduct prosecutions, prosecutors were similarly absolutely
immune from § 1983 damages liability for such conduct. 6
For present purposes, the relevant common law immunity
background indicates that, in 1871, law enforcement officers whose
illegal conduct was not prescribed by a presumptively valid court
order were not protected by absolute immunity, quasi-judicial or
otherwise. Specifically, an inquiry into that background as set out in
treatises by Cooley and Mechem87 demonstrates that sheriffs and
deputy sheriffs who used excessive force in making an arrest or
otherwise restraining citizens88 were not protected from tort liability,
even where pursuant to court order. These treatises also make clear
that arresting or restraining someone was not considered a judicial act
under the then-extant common law, even though doing so involved
the exercise of judgment.
Cooley states that a defendant under arrest is entitled to be
treated with ordinary humanity by a sheriff, and, for purposes of tort
liability, any unnecessary severity cannot be justified by the arrest
writ." He also declares that a sheriff must not make any mistakes in
connection with the execution of a writ. Cooley expressly rejects the
argument that a ministerial mistake by a sheriff is a judicial act just
because the sheriff must exercise judgment. In his view of the
relevant tort law, the mere exercise of judgment cannot be the test
between a judicial act and a ministerial act of the sort engaged in by
sheriffs regarding executions of writs because the underlying factual
84. Id. at 418.
85. Id. at 421.
86. Id. at 427.
87. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (Callaghan 1880) and FLOYD R.
MECHEM, THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS (Callaghan 1890) [hereinafter
"COOLEY" and "MECHEM"]. Both of these treatises are regularly relied on by the
Supreme Court to determine the relevant common law immunity background in the fourth
quarter of the 19th century.
88. Restraining a citizen pursuant to judicial order, even where it takes place in a
courtroom, is akin to an arrest, if not identical to it. For this reason, the descriptions by
COOLEY and MECHEM of arrest law are relevant.
89. COOLEY, supra note 87, at 395.
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question is referred by the law to the sheriff himself."° Cooley
explains:
It is difficult to name any subject in respect to which questions
may not be raised; and if the existence of a question could be
the test between [protected] judicial and [unprotected]
ministerial action, there would be very little that would be
classed as ministerial. Judicial action implies not merely a
question, but a question referred for solution to the judgment
or discretion of the officer himself.91
In Hendren, and like cases, it is clearly the law enforcement officers
who decide how to restrain others, not the judge.
Mechem is equally supportive of this view of the common law
immunity background. Thus, his list of quasi-judicial officers and
functions does not include anything resembling the making of an
arrest, even pursuant to court order. 2  Also, in the course of
characterizing service of process by sheriffs, marshals, coroners and
constables as ministerial, 3 Mecham points out, as Cooley does, that a
quasi-judicial official who acts ministerially can be liable in tort
because an act can be ministerial even if it involves skill, judgment
and discretion.9" He further declares that a sheriff can be liable for
abuse of process in making an arrest,95 and for the arrest of the wrong
person, even though the sheriff's mistake was reasonable.96
Consequently, the relevant common law immunity background for
law enforcement officers and the common law's characterization of
their liability for abuse of process in making an arrest do not support
the grant of quasi-judicial immunity to law enforcement officers
whose challenged conduct is not that prescribed by court order.'
90. Id. at 396.
91. Id.
92. MECHEM, supra note 87, at 421-24.
93. Id. at 485.
94. Id. at 429.
95. Id. at 514.
96. Id. at 518.
97. The Court has declared that where the common law in 1871 would not confer
absolute immunity, "[tihe presumption is that qualified immunity is sufficient to protect
government officials in the exercise of their duties, [and] we have been quite sparing in our
recognition of absolute immunity, and have refused to extend it any further than its
justification would warrant." Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 n.4
(quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)). Significantly, the Supreme Court
has never held in a §1983 case that absolute immunity is applicable where the 1871
common law would find it inapplicable.
It is worth noting that in Richman, the Seventh Circuit observed that classically ministerial
conduct of law enforcement officers was not entitled to absolute immunity at common law.
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The foregoing discussion, extensively criticizing the Eighth
Circuit's Hendren decision on various grounds, focused primarily on
the doctrinal aspects of quasi-judicial immunity in the context of
judicial immunity. In arguing that quasi-judicial immunity should not
protect law enforcement officers who violate constitutional rights in
the course of enforcing a presumptively valid court order, even in the
courtroom, I concluded that Hendren is seriously flawed. Part VI of
this Article deals with theoretical implications of this critique. But
before considering those implications, it is appropriate to address §
1983 liability for law enforcement conduct that is prescribed by
presumptively invalid court orders.
V. Challenges to Conduct Prescribed by
Presumptively Invalid Court Orders
Section 1983 liability for following presumptively invalid court
orders is a subject analogous to the unsuccessful "following orders"
defense to war crimes at Nuremberg.98 Although it has seldom arisen
in § 1983 case law, the subject should still be addressed in order to
complete the § 1983 picture. Simply put, neither absolute nor
qualified immunity should protect a police officer where, for example,
a judge orders that police officer to shoot a lawyer in order to bring
the lawyer to her courtroom and the police officer complies.
A. Absolute Immunity
That the police officer should be unprotected by absolute
immunity is supported by several considerations. First, as argued
previously,99 the judge's order to shoot is not a judicial act protected
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 435 n.3. It cited the treatises of Cooley and Mechem
for this proposition. Id.
98. Article 8 of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal's (IMT) Charter
provided that "[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or
of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment." Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the IMT, Vol. 1, 10, 12 (1947)
(official text of the IMT in English). However, the defense will be successful where the
order followed was not obviously unlawful. HILLAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 221 (1990). For a
recent and useful discussion, see Gary Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War:
Judicial Application in American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 481 (1999). Note that
this rule is consistent with the position I take for § 1983 liability where the challenged
conduct is prescribed by a presumptively valid court order. Compare Model Penal Code §
2.10 (emphasis added), which reads as follows: "It is an affirmative defense that the actor,
in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than execute an
order of his superior in the armed forces that he does not know to be unlawful."
99. See discussion supra note 48.
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by judicial immunity. It would be anomalous to allow a police officer
who complied with an obviously unconstitutional judicial order to be
protected by absolute immunity when the judge who issued the order
was not. Second, a rule that disallows absolute immunity to the police
officer in this situation is analogous to the rule that creates an
exception to the collateral bar rule. Under the collateral bar rule, an
injunction "must be obeyed until it is set aside, and.., persons
subject to the [injunction] who disobey it may not defend against the
ensuing charge of criminal contempt on the ground that the order was
erroneous or even unconstitutional."'" However, where an injunction
is "transparently invalid or has only a frivolous pretense to validity,"
then it may be disobeyed and challenged as unconstitutional without
fear of criminal contempt for its violation.' °' Just as a citizen has no
obligation to obey an obviously unconstitutional injunction, a police
officer is not required to obey an obviously unconstitutional judicial
order. Indeed, his or her constitutional obligation is disobedience,
particularly where compliance will injure an innocent third party.
B. Qualified Immunity
That qualified immunity should be similarly inapplicable, a
somewhat harder issue, can be inferred from Malley v. Briggs. 3 The
Supreme Court declared in Malley that where a police officer acts on
the basis of a warrant mistakenly issued by a judge, even where the
warrant was requested by the police officer, the officer is protected by
qualified immunity so long as the officer acted within the range of
professional competence." But if no officer of reasonable
competence would have requested the warrant in the first place-as
in Malley itself-then the officer cannot escape liability just because it
turns out that the judge acted unconstitutionally. This suggests that
100. Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551-52
(1977).
101. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967). To put this point in a
different way: even though the § 1983 challenge to the police officer's act is effectively a
challenge to the judge's presumptively invalid order, appellate review is unnecessary
because that order is obviously unlawful. Thus, the rationale for conferring quasi-judicial
immunity on police officers whose conduct is prescribed by presumptively valid court
orders is inapplicable where court orders are presumptively invalid.
102. Cf. Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (police officers have an
affirmative constitutional duty to protect citizens against the use of excessive force by
fellow officers when the unconstitutional conduct takes place in their presence and they
are able to prevent it).
103. 475 U.S. 335, 345 n.9 (1986).
104. Id. at 349.
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reliance by a police officer on a judicial determination is not
protected by qualified immunity where the officer knows of the
judge's gross incompetence or neglect of duty. Hence, in the
hypothetical, the judge's blatantly unconstitutional order to shoot the
lawyer demonstrates both the judge's gross incompetence and neglect
of duty and should not be followed by the police. To the extent that a
police officer did in fact follow the order, he or she would therefore
violate clearly (and obviously) settled law and would not be insulated
by the judge's decision.'
The above positions are consistent with an emphasis on
corrective justice and individual responsibility not only in § 1983
jurisprudence but in tort law and (for individual responsibility)
criminal law as well."6  They are also consistent with those cases
indicating that police officers who rely on orders of their superiors are
protected by qualified immunity so long as those orders are not
facially outrageous and/or the police officers are relatively new or
inexperienced in the matter.'0 7
105. See also Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpreting
Malley's footnote to mean that police officers should not be required to second-guess a
judge's order unless they know the order is obviously outside the range of the judge's
professional competence).
106. When the "following orders" defense is raised in connection with tort liability, the
rule is that "[o]ne whose conduct is otherwise tortious is not relieved from liability merely
by the fact that his conduct is pursuant to the command of or is on account of another."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: EFFECT OF ACTING AT COMMAND OF OR ON
ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER § 888 (1979). Comment (a) explains that the underlying
principle of § 888 is the "common law conception that each person is a free individual
having equality with all others, with respect both to duties and to liabilities."
The "following orders" defense also arises in connection with criminal responsibility.
Section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code provides that the only kind of duress that may
constitute an affirmative defense is coercion by the use or threat of unlawful force against
the actor or another, where a person of "reasonable firmness in his situation would have
been unable to resist." In addition, § 2.04 provides that a belief that conduct does not
legally constitute a criminal offense can be a defense where the actor acts in "reasonable
reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or
erroneous, contained in ... (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment .... " (emphasis
added). See also note 98, supra, on the Nuremberg defense.
107. See, e.g., Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000)
(prison suicide case in which deputy sheriff, who followed superiors' orders that were not
facially outrageous, and who was relatively new, was protected by qualified immunity
because he acted reasonably); Balida v. McCloud, 211 F.3d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 2002) (in
Fourth Amendment destruction of property case, police officers were protected by
qualified immunity because they reasonably relied on plausible instructions from a
superior officer: "there were no warning signs or bases for suspicion about the lawfulness
of the order"); Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (qualified immunity
applicable where there was reliance on superior's plausibly legal instructions); and
Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (reliance unreasonable where
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VI. Corrective Justice, Individual Responsibility,
the Growth of Constitutional Law and the
Educational Functions of § 1983 Liability
Section 1983 has been, and to a considerable extent still remains,
a remarkable federal statute. Expressly intended by Congress to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it makes state and local
government officials and employees, and local governments
themselves, potentially liable in damages for harm caused by their
unconstitutional conduct. The damages remedy functions not only to
deter unconstitutional conduct but also to compensate innocent
people as a matter of corrective justice.' Regrettably, however, the
Supreme Court has all too often emphasized the possible over-
deterrence of government officials and employees at the expense of
providing corrective justice to those harmed by unconstitutional
conduct. It is fair to say that this move has been based on the Court's
intuition about the non-meritorious nature of many § 1983 claims,09
to say nothing of its concern for federalism,"' and its apparent distaste
for many § 1983 plaintiffs, especially prisoners. 1' It was on such
grounds, for example, that the Court transformed qualified immunity,
originally a defense to liability,"2 into an immunity from suit,
effectively converting it, primarily for instrumental reasons, into a
superior's advice was clearly contrary to law).
108. Although I emphasize corrective justice throughout this Article, Congress clearly
intended § 1983 to deter constitutional violations as well as compensate for harm caused.
In the tort context, it has been argued that there is no necessary inconsistency between a
deterrence rationale and a corrective justice rationale. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801 (1997) (arguing that deterrence furthers corrective justice goals).
109. Concern for non-meritorious claims was an explicit consideration in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), where the Court eliminated the subjective part of the
qualified immunity test and made the test one of objective reasonableness in light of pre-
existing law. Id. at 818.
110. Section 1983 raises several obvious federalism issues. For one thing, it is state and
local government employees and local governments who are sued under federal law. For
another, since most § 1983 claims are brought in federal court, it is the federal judiciary
that ends up supervising state and local government affairs. I have suggested elsewhere
that "many of the Court's decisions appear to treat § 1983 as a symbol of anti-federalism."
See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77
GEO. L. J. 1719, 1746 (1989).
111. I have maintained elsewhere that "[t]o signal its view that many § 1983 suits waste
time and resources, the Court has chosen to review § 1983 cases brought by prisoners 'in
particular, ostensibly trivial cases involving lost hobby-kit materials and injuries resulting
from pillows left on prison stairs."' See id. at 1744.
112. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (establishing two-part, subjective and
objective test for qualified immunity for law enforcement officers).
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kind of absolute immunity."'
Still, as potent as qualified immunity often is, it does not
invariably defeat every § 1983 plaintiff's claim. There are always
egregious cases in which a defendant has acted in an objectively
unreasonable manner in light of pre-existing law and thereby loses
qualified immunity. In marked contrast, absolute immunity, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial, does not even inquire into whether the
challenged conduct violated clearly settled constitutional law at the
time it occurred. Instead, it applies broadly to protect the defendant
regardless of the nature and scope of the constitutional violation
alleged. When misapplied, absolute immunity has serious
repercussions for corrective justice, individual responsibility, the
growth of constitutional law and the educational functions of § 1983
liability.
A. Corrective Justice and Individual Responsibility
Although it was only in 1978, in the now-famous Monell case,114
that the Court interpreted § 1983 to include local governments, there
has never been any doubt that natural persons are covered by the
word 'person' in the statute. By its very terms, then, § 1983 makes
individuals responsible for the constitutional harm they cause others.
From a classical liberal perspective, such individual responsibility,
similar to that reflected in the common law of torts,15 has several
components. One is the concept of personal autonomy: as a means
of promoting their own growth and development, individuals must
have a wide range of choices in a liberal society. At the same time,
this liberty of choice is limited by the principle that individuals may
not engage in wrongful conduct that causes harm to others, which is
related to a second component: the normative obligation to pay for
the harm thereby caused, as required by corrective justice."6
113. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow is criticized for understating
the costs to § 1983 victims and for overstating the costs to § 1983 individual defendants,
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 8:5.
114. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), discussed at great length in
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION ch. 6.
115. See the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as follows for private
parties:
§ 888 Effect of Acting at Command of or on Account of Another.
One whose conduct is otherwise tortious is not relieved from liability merely by
the fact that his conduct is pursuant to the command of or is on account of
another.
116. See note 11, supra, on corrective justice.
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These components of individual responsibility under § 1983
clearly have a great deal in common with tort liability in general, but
they differ because of their application in the § 1983 setting to state
and local government officials and employees. It is not just the
interests of the individual plaintiff and the individual defendant which
are directly implicated by § 1983 liability (as is, in contrast, typically
the case in bi-polar tort litigation involving private parties) but also
the community's interest in the effective functioning of government
and, more specifically, in minimizing the chilling effects on
independent decision-making of both defending against suit and
potential liability. The importance of this public interest, often
described as avoiding over-deterrence, has been endlessly asserted by
the Supreme Court in its absolute and qualified immunity cases and,
not surprisingly, has been extensively commented on in the
literature. 17
However, in light of the severe consequences of absolute
immunity, this interest must not be over-weighted. The application of
absolute immunity means that the § 1983 plaintiff is not compensated
for constitutional harm caused by the defendant, even though it may
be undisputed in the particular case that the defendant in fact
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and was thus at fault. This
result; sound as it may be in connection with core judicial decision-
making,"8 comes at the expense of corrective justice and individual
responsibility.
Seen from this perspective, Hendren's approach to quasi-judicial
immunity was fundamentally misguided when it expanded the
defense of following judicial orders. "9 Hendren overstated the costs,
and understated the benefits, of constitutional compliance. It
117. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983); Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981).
118. As maintained earlier, see supra note 49, absolute immunity may be justified,
despite its adverse impact on corrective justice, only when it promotes the efficient
operation of the justice system itself. Even in such cases, it might be suggested that the
governmental employer of the absolutely immune defendant ought to be liable for
damages under a respondeat superiot theory inasmuch as the plaintiff's individual interest
has been taken by the community. Compare the public necessity cases in tort law where a
government official who unreasonably destroys the plaintiff's property because of a threat
to the community is absolutely immune from tort liability, even though corrective justice
requires compensation to the plaintiff. However, there is currently no respondeat superior
liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Moreover,
states are not suable persons under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
119. Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997).
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demonstrated both a remarkable insensitivity to the harm caused by
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the police officer and a
willingness to allow the plaintiff's interest to be sacrificed for the
community. This sacrifice for the community is incompatible with the
Kantian principle that a person is to be valued and treated as "an end
in himself" and not as "a means to the ends of others. 1 20 It calls for a
heavy burden of justification, one that, I have argued, is not carried
when, as in Hendren, the normatively blameful unconstitutional
conduct of law enforcement officers is not prescribed by a
presumptively valid court order. In Hendren, the plaintiff had no
meaningful opportunity to secure corrective justice and the defendant
(so far as we know) avoided responsibility for his allegedly
unconstitutional conduct
121
B. The Growth of Constitutional Law
A fair amount has been written recently about the relationship
between § 1983 damages liability and the growth of constitutional
law.122 It has been argued, primarily by John Jeffries, that since a
judge hearing § 1983 damages liability cases knows that a new
constitutional decision will not come at the financial expense of the
current § 1983 defendant because of qualified immunity, limiting §
1983 damages remedies for constitutional violations in this manner
promotes the growth of substantive constitutional law. At the same
time, future § 1983 plaintiffs will be entitled to relief because the
earlier case (in which the new rule was set out when qualified
immunity protection was accorded the defendant) provided notice to
all potential defendants. This separation of rights from remedies,
according to Jeffries, appropriately shifts wealth to younger
generations. '
Given recent qualified immunity decisions in which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly insisted that trial courts first determine whether
there was an initial constitutional violation,124 Jeffries is correct that
120. KANT, supra note 11.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L. J. 87 (1999); John C. Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L. J.
259 (2000); Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091
(criticizing Jeffries); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 U. VA.
L. REV. 1 (2002) (applying analysis to harmless error).
123. Jeffries, supra note 100, at 105.
124. E.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due
process); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (Fourth Amendment); Saucier v. Katz, 533
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qualified immunity does not slow the growth of constitutional law,
and is perhaps correct that qualified immunity may even promote it.
25
If so, according only qualified immunity protection to law
enforcement officers who act in a manner not prescribed by a
presumptively valid court order could promote the growth of
constitutional law. In contrast, according quasi-judicial immunity to
those law enforcement officers would likely have some negative
impact on the growth of constitutional law.
This can be seen from a comparison of judicial immunity and
quasi-judicial immunity. First, consider judicial immunity itself.
Judges do not ordinarily address the merits of the plaintiff's § 1983
claim when dismissing on absolute immunity grounds. In addition,
the 1996 Federal Courts Improvement Act bars injunctive relief
actions against judges in most situations.26 One might think, then,
that these factors demonstrate that absolute judicial immunity
provides minimal opportunities for constitutional growth because
rights are permanently severed from remedies. However, this is not
the case. One of the core policy justifications for judicial immunity is
the availability of appellate review of a judge's allegedly
unconstitutional conduct. Many § 1983 cases involve constitutional
challenges to judicial conduct arising out of trial or pretrial civil and
(especially) criminal proceedings, and such challenges can ordinarily
be litigated in appellate courts, where new constitutional law can be
made without concern for the trial judge's personal liability.
For the most part, then, judicial immunity does not retard the
growth of constitutional law. But while that may be true for judicial
immunity, it does not help make the case that quasi-judicial immunity
should protect law enforcement officers whose challenged conduct
does not comply with a presumptively valid court order, as in
Hendren and Richman. To the contrary: because in such cases
U.S. 194 (2001) (Fourth Amendment).
125. Whether Jeffries is correct that for this and related reasons, qualified immunity is
overall a good thing, is seriously questionable in light of the adverse effect on the ability of
§ 1983 plaintiffs to recover for harm caused them. Although his position is considerably
more nuanced than what is set out here-essentially he is attempting to demonstrate that
there are constitutional advantages to qualified immunity (which separates rights from
remedies) as well as disadvantages-the consequence of his position is that much harm
caused by wrongful unconstitutional conduct remains unredressed. However, further
discussion of Jeffries' position is beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, I
use his position to support my own view that only qualified immunity should protect law
enforcement officers whose conduct is not prescribed by presumptively valid judicial
orders.
126. Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996).
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appellate review is typically not available, growth-of-law
considerations suggest that law enforcement officers whose conduct is
not prescribed by a presumptively valid court order should be
protected only by qualified immunity. '27
C. The Educational Functions of § 1983 Liability
In addition to providing for corrective justice, § 1983 liability
serves important educational functions for the parties and for those
similarly situated. It provides a meaningful opportunity to
characterize a defendant's conduct as blameworthy,128 thereby
emphasizing the importance of corrective justice and individual
responsibility. In contrast to situations in which only qualified
immunity applies,129  the opportunity for declaring conduct
blameworthy is lost where quasi-judicial immunity is applied.
Moreover, § 1983 liability educates the governmental institutions
involved. In cases involving alleged misconduct by state judges, for
example, the state judiciary has an important interest in knowing
what its judges are doing. Similarly, in cases involving law
enforcement officers enforcing court orders, the state judiciary and
institutions of law enforcement should know how competent those
officers are. Finally, the community has a vital First Amendment
interest in knowing of alleged irregularities in the conduct of judges
and law enforcement officers so that it can engage in intelligent
democratic decision-making.
1 30
Even more broadly, § 1983 liability educates the community
about the social contract that underlies democratic institutions and
rule of law values. Section 1983 is covenantal in nature: by enacting
§1983, Congress declared that there is a special 13' reciprocal
relationship between the states (including local governments) and
their citizens. Just as citizens must obey the law and bear the
127. In contrast, growth-of-law considerations do support the position that law
enforcement officers whose challenged conduct is prescribed by a presumptively valid
court order should be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, which is what the circuits have
concluded. See discussion supra at 624.
128. See Barbara Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583 (1998) (arguing that § 1983 damages liability has a "moral blaming function"
analogous to criminal prosecution). Id. at 591.
129. The Court has insisted recently that, as part of the qualified immunity inquiry, a
court should first decide whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action before it gets to
the objective reasonableness question. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001);
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
130. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131. In the sense that it goes beyond the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone.
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financial and other consequences when they do not, states, too, must
obey not only their own laws but the Fourteenth Amendment (the
supreme law of the land) and bear the financial and other
consequences when they do not. In a very real sense, § 1983 liability
educates state and local governments and their officials and
employees in virtuous behavior.'32 We want government officials and
employees to know what justice requires.' And to the extent that, as
Hendren would have it, quasi-judicial immunity applies to the conduct
of law enforcement officers not prescribed by a presumptively valid
court order, this important educational function has been
undermined.
VII. Conclusion
With the foregoing discussion of corrective justice, individual
responsibility, the growth of constitutional law and the educational
functions of § 1983 liability, we appear to have come a long way from
the seemingly narrow topic of judicial orders and § 1983 quasi-judicial
immunity. But in reality we have not. These kinds of issues can arise
at whatever stage § 1983 is analyzed, whether it be the elements of the
prima facie case, local government liability, or any of the immunities.
I have chosen to address these issues in the context of quasi-judicial
immunity, specifically by analyzing the Eighth Circuit's Hendren
decision critically and using it as a foil.
Although absolute immunity, including judicial immunity, is
inconsistent with corrective justice, there is no gainsaying the crucial
policy consideration that supports judicial immunity in cases involving
core deliberative judicial decision-making conduct, namely, the
effective operation of the justice system itself. However, there is no
comparable support in doctrine or in theory for the broad application
of quasi-judicial immunity to law enforcement officers who defend on
the ground that they were following judicial orders. Quasi-judicial
immunity should only apply to law enforcement officers and others
132. This is the flip side of classical republicanism's position that government should
educate its citizens in order to promote civic virtue among them. See Cass Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 36 (1985) ("Adhering to
the traditional republican view, the antifederalists argued that civil society should operate
as an educator, and not merely as a regulator of private conduct.")
133. Tony Honore has written that one of the functions of tort law is to announce that
there are some actions that should not be done. Tony Honore, The Morality of Tort Law:
Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 75 (David
Owen, ed. 1995). He also observes that to comply with the rule of law, government must
"set out and enforce certain rights of the citizen, even against itself." Id. at 77 n.8.
Summer 2002] COURT ORDERS AND SECTION 1983
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
whose challenged conduct is prescribed by presumptively valid court
orders. In such cases, a § 1983 damages action is in effect a challenge
to the validity of the underlying court order itself. In contrast, neither
absolute nor qualified immunity should protect law enforcement
officers and others who follow presumptively invalid judicial orders.
A 'following orders' defense has no place in these types of § 1983
cases.
Finally, quasi-judicial immunity should not apply to law
enforcement officers and others whose allegedly unconstitutional
conduct is not prescribed by presumptively valid court orders.
Qualified immunity is more than adequate to protect society's
interest in avoiding over-deterrence of government officials. To
apply quasi-judicial immunity in such cases would be to overdo over-
deterrence at the cost of important individual and societal values.
Quasi-judicial immunity of the kind preached by Hendren must be
firmly rejected because it is inconsistent with growth-of-law
considerations and the educational functions of § 1983 liability. It is
also fundamentally unjust.
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